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Residents from Chicago's Southside speak out to save their homes from 
foreclosure.
i. introduction
The sixtieth anniversary of the universal declaration of human rights (udhr) Will Be rememBered as an international Breakthrough for the protection of 
economic, social and cultural rights (social rights). This cat-
egory of rights has been given second-class status and treated 
with mistrust and caution. Their adjudication was considered 
impossible and undesirable. Yet on December 10, 2008, the UN 
General Assembly unanimously adopted an Optional Protocol 
(Protocol) to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (Covenant) that enables victims of viola-
tions of rights covered by the Covenant to file individual com-
plaints to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Committee). Its adoption marks a watershed in the quest 
for realizing the UDHR’s promise expressed by the UN motto, 
“All human rights for all.”
Adoption of the Protocol resonated positively within the 
global human rights community. Thirty-six UN human rights 
Special Rapporteurs welcomed the Protocol’s adoption as “an 
essential step” in reinforcing “the universality, indivisibility, 
interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights, and 
the guarantee of dignity and justice for all.”1 Similarly, the 
International NGO Coalition for an Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
described it as “an historic advance for human rights.”2 The 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, 
described the adoption as having “singular importance by clos-
ing a historic gap.”3
Not all, however, are excited about the Protocol. Most nota-
bly and importantly, the reaction of states was mixed. Although 
some states expressed their intention to become parties to the 
Protocol, others voiced serious skepticism regarding the ratio-
nale of adjudicating social rights and therefore the existence of 
the Protocol itself. This essay briefly describes the main features 
of the Protocol before specifying the concerns held by some 
states regarding the Protocol. Finally, the essay attempts to dis-
pel the concerns and present arguments for why states should 
ratify the Protocol.
ii. tHe content of tHe protocoL
Even though a new treaty, others have already analyzed the 
Protocol elsewhere.4 An overview of its main features, however, 
is appropriate. The Protocol is in many ways a standard instru-
ment establishing the right of individuals claiming to have suf-
fered violations of their rights to file a complaint before an inter-
national body. Its main features are similar to the corresponding 
mechanisms under other UN human rights treaties. The Protocol 
spells out admissibility criteria for accepting communications 
and contains procedural rules for the Committee to deal with 
them. Similar to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention 
against Torture, the Protocol creates an optional inquiry proce-
dure if the Committee “receives reliable information indicating 
grave or systematic violations by a State Party of any of the eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights set forth in the Covenant.” As in 
the newer mechanisms (i.e. optional protocols to CEDAW and 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities) the 
Protocol contains an explicit acknowledgement of the power of 
the Committee to issue interim measures. An innovative feature 
of this Protocol, however, is the express inclusion of a follow-up 
procedure under which states are obliged to respond within six 
months to the recommendations of the Committee.
admiSSiBiLity criteria
The inclusion of particular admissibility criteria was among 
the more contentious issues during the negotiations and an area 
where some compromises had to be made. Besides the standard 
admissibility criteria like exhaustion of domestic remedies, 
compatibility ratione materiae and temporis, etc., there are two 
new criteria. First, a communication must not be “exclusively 
based on reports disseminated by mass media.”5 This provision 
was included in order to exclude communications dependent 
only on second-hand information and thus only indirectly related 
to the alleged victim or petitioner. Crucial, however, is the addi-
tion of a new criterion in international law. Under Article 4 of the 
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Protocol, the Committee can declare a communication inadmis-
sible if it “does not reveal that the author has suffered a clear dis-
advantage.” This provision mirrors a similar condition included 
in Protocol 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights 
which is not yet in force, by which European countries have tried 
to address the vast volume of complaints in Strasbourg. A simi-
lar rationale was behind the addition of the criterion here. It is 
meant to give a tool to the Committee with which it can protect 
itself from being flooded by communications.
The inclusion of Article 4 was far from uncontroversial. 
Some viewed it as limiting the access of victims of violations to 
the procedure and signaling that some violations of the Covenant 
do not matter. One must keep in mind, however, that it is only a 
procedural criterion. It does not follow that states do not need to 
remedy “minor” violations of the Covenant. It is only a way for 
the Committee to manage its workload and concentrate on the 
most important cases should the need arise. In that sense, given 
that the Committee “may” apply this admissibility criterion 
“if necessary,”6 it should not be used unless the Committee is 
overwhelmed with cases to the point that it makes both effective 
examination of communications and its other work impossible.
tHe iSSue of coLLective rigHtS
A last minute compromise was achieved at the Human 
Rights Council regarding the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
Committee, an issue that threatened the whole Protocol. The 
controversy was and still is whether the Committee should be 
able to review communications alleging violations of the right 
to self-determination. Ultimately the issue was not resolved and 
was left for the Committee to decide. During the adoption in 
the General Assembly, many states cautioned against such an 
approach, opining that the Committee should adopt the same 
interpretation as the Human Rights Committee, which maintains 
that individuals do not have standing to claim that a state has 
violated the right to self-determination because it is a collective 
right.7 As the Human Rights Committee can receive only indi-
vidual communications, it effectively cannot consider alleged 
violations of the right to self-determination. A similar interpreta-
tion may be warranted here as the Protocol also does not allow 
collective complaints.
Yet, interpreting the Protocol in such a way that would limit 
standing to individuals and groups of individuals may pose a 
problem vis-à-vis other collective rights in the Covenant, namely 
the rights of trade unions under Article 8. Some suggest that the 
Committee may consider trade unions a group of individuals.8 If 
that is accepted by the Committee then it can be argued analogi-
cally that “people” enjoying the right to self-determination are 
nothing more than a group of individuals. From this perspective 
the questions whether the Committee can consider communica-
tions alleging violation of trade unions rights and the right to 
self-determination are closely connected.
Another thorny issue in the negotiations was how the 
Protocol would deal with the obligation of international coop-
eration towards realizing the rights in the Covenant. Ultimately, 
the Committee will be only allowed to send recommendations 
regarding need for technical assistance to specialized UN agen-
cies, funds and programs and other competent bodies. A novel 
provision, however, envisions creation of a voluntary trust fund, 
which would finance programs of building national capacities 
regarding technical expertise relevant for social rights.
Overall, it is fair to say that the Protocol is a major success 
in terms of its coherence and integrity. It does not compromise 
or undermine any of the rights in the Covenant or any aspects of 
the rights. On the contrary, it establishes the first comprehensive 
and universal procedure for individual complaints regarding 
violations of all aspects of social rights. Yet adoption of the 
instrument by the General Assembly is only a preliminary step. 
Its acceptance and ratification by as many states as possible is 
equally if not more important. The article next identifies and 
responds to some concerns states had with the Protocol and 
subsequently presents arguments for its ratification.
iii. oBJectionS to tHe protocoL
While many governments welcomed the adoption of the 
Protocol, several countries expressed skepticism about the 
individual adjudication of social rights. Their comments cen-
tered on the alleged difficulty in adjudicating these complaints. 
Specifically, governments who spoke against the Protocol were 
concerned with the vagueness of the Covenant, the progressive 
nature of the obligations and the illegitimate transgression into 
states’ (mainly budgetary) policies.
It is telling, though, that in the public record no delegation 
defended an absolutist view that social rights are not justiciable. 
Rather, they put forward specific arguments concerning why the 
Covenant is not easily subject to adjudication. Hopefully, this 
signals that the debate on justiciability has become largely obso-
lete. The shift is understandable given mounting evidence and 
examples of cases and decisions on social rights. Commenting 
on a recent publication that compiled social rights cases from 
various jurisdictions, Philip Alston, one of the early proponents 
of the Protocol in the beginning of 1990s, said, “This book pro-
vides eloquent testimony to the fact that the debate about the 
justiciability of social rights has come of age.”9
The point that social rights are not conceptually differ-
ent from civil and political rights and therefore susceptible to 
adjudication in the same way has been argued extensively and 
persuasively elsewhere.10 Consequently, this essay focuses only 
on specific arguments governments raised.
First, the premise that civil rights, compared with social rights, 
are defined precisely is indefensible. For example by reading the 
succinctly written Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) (“No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment”) it is not immediately obvious that a violation will occur 
when states do not effectively investigate alleged acts of torture. 
Moreover, it is not obvious that states must provide necessary 
medical treatment to detainees; nor is it clear from the language 
of Article 7 which acts constitute torture. Yet, the Human Rights 
Committee found in its case-law all these obligations to arise 
from Article 7. To find all obligations generated by a right and 
to clarify any ambiguities, practitioners must look to the case 
law and not simply the text of an article. Even if the rights in the 
Covenant look imprecise, it does not hinder their adjudication 
any more than civil rights. After all, interpreting and making 
obligations concrete by relating them to real life situations and 
questions is the essence of judicial work.11
Second, social rights in the Covenant are defined as “pro-
gressive.” Under the Covenant, a state party “undertakes to take 
steps . . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a view 
to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recog-
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nized in the present Covenant.”12 In contrast, under the ICCPR, 
states simply undertake to “respect and to ensure” the rights.13 
But even that does not make them conceptually different to the 
extent that they would be unjusticiable. First, not all obliga-
tions from the Covenant are progressive in nature. An example 
is the prohibition of discrimination.14 But that is arguably not 
important, given that the Protocol envisions adjudication of all 
obligations under the Covenant. Yet progressive obligations do 
not mean that they should be fulfilled sometime in the future. 
It is an immediate obligation to take “deliberate, concrete and 
targeted” steps towards achieving full realization of the rights in 
the Covenant.15 As such, it becomes a matter of evaluating the 
steps taken by the government.
Human rights obligations can be divided into two categories: 
obligations of result and obligations of due diligence. The former 
requires reaching concrete results; for example, the absence of 
acts of torture. If the result is not achieved, a violation occurs. The 
latter concentrates not on results, but on the process or procedure. 
For example, states must effectively investigate all alleged acts 
of torture. Such investigations must fulfill certain criteria, but a 
violation does not always occur when a perpetrator is not found or 
punished. These latter obligations might be seen as more vague; 
but they are only more complex. There is no single fact which, 
if proved, results in a violation. Deliberation of the adjudicator 
involves testing the conduct against multiple criteria. This kind 
of deliberation is far from impossible; human rights bodies have 
engaged in these tests for years while adjudicating civil and politi-
cal rights. It is therefore not the case that adjudicating progressive 
obligations, which are obligations of due diligence, is impossible, 
or per se illegitimately transgresses state policies.
Similarly, civil rights also have extensive budgetary implica-
tions. Therefore, it is simply not possible to say that decisions 
with budgetary implications are illegitimate as a matter of course. 
The underlying concern is a fear that an overzealous Committee 
will dictate state policies. Critics say that the Committee should 
not tell states how much to spend on healthcare, housing, nor 
education, etc. The crux of the dispute, therefore, is not justicia-
bility of social rights itself but the methods of (quasi-)judicial 
review. The Protocol accommodates these concerns well.
One of the crucial issues in the negotiation of the Protocol 
was to agree on a test the Committee should adopt in reviewing 
the positive obligation of states. This is indeed the current topi-
cal issue in the justiciability debate. Article 8(4) of the Protocol 
stipulates that “the Committee shall consider the reasonableness 
of the steps taken . . . In doing so, the Committee shall bear in 
mind that the State Party may adopt a range of possible policy 
measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the 
Covenant.” This language ensures that the Committee does not 
illegitimately transgress into the field of policy decisions.
In fact, the current practice of the Committee shows that 
it is working exactly along these lines. It has made clear that 
states exercise a margin of discretion in devising their policies 
implementing the Covenant.16 The need for such discretion is 
acknowledged in the expert opinions17 and literature advocating 
social rights protection.18 Consequently, there is no basis to fear 
that the Committee will engage in overzealous and illegitimate 
review practices. Providing states with considerable discretion 
implies that even if the Committee might think that there are 
better ways to secure social rights, it does not follow that there 
is a violation of the Covenant. A violation will happen only if the 
measures taken by the state fail the test of reasonableness.
The standard of reasonableness is famously used in adju-
dicating progressive obligations under the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa.19 The test is also well known in adju-
dicating civil and political rights. The European Court of Human 
Rights uses reasonableness in deciding if the measure a state 
adopted in fulfilling its obligation to protect is satisfactory.20 
More generally, the concept of reasonableness is widely used 
in common-law systems. The test captures the idea that most 
rights, including all social rights, are not absolute. For example, 
not everyone has a right to be provided with a house. Rather 
states must take reasonable steps to ensure that everyone has 
access to adequate housing. If somebody does not have access, 
a violation is still not inevitable because the steps taken might 
still be reasonable. Applying the test to particular cases, the 
Committee can be further guided by the abundant experience of 
other bodies in other contexts.
The Committee has already articulated its preliminary 
thoughts on how it would determine whether adopted mea-
sures are reasonable. It emphasizes the procedural criterion of 
“transparent and participative decision-making processes.”21 
Substantively, it pointed, inter alia, to requirements that the 
[T]he Protocol is a major success in terms of its 
coherence and integrity. It does not compromise or 
undermine any of the rights in the Covenant or any 
aspects of the rights. On the contrary, it establishes 
the first comprehensive and universal procedure for 
individual complaints regarding violations of all aspects 
of [economic,] social, [and cultural] rights.
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exercise of discretion is non-discriminatory, that the measures 
are deliberate, concrete and targeted, and take into account 
“disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups.”22 
These criteria hardly evoke an overzealous second-judgment of 
government policies.
Moreover, the fears of illegitimate transgression into states’ 
policies are considerably lowered by nature of the Committee’s 
mandate. All the Committee can issue are recommendations. 
So there is no well-founded fear that the Committee would sub-
stitute state’s decisions by its own judgments. The State party 
would still have the option of adopting its own alternative mea-
sures, as the Committee itself acknowledges.23 Consequently, 
the fear that the Committee will dictate states’ budgets and the 
general issue of appropriate remedies for violations of social 
rights is moot.
Even though the concerns of states vis-à-vis the Protocol are 
unfounded, a question still remains why states should ratify the 
Protocol. The next and last section will present several argu-
ments for ratification.
iv. reaSonS to ratify
There are myriad reasons why individuals should have 
access to international remedies when alleging human rights 
violations. The main reason is that there should be independent 
oversight of states’ human rights obligations. With the wide 
range of international mechanisms allowing individuals to 
petition civil rights violations, the principle is hardly disputed. 
Bearing in mind that all arguments for individual access apply 
in the same way to social rights, the question is whether there 
are particular reasons for establishing individual petitions for 
victims of social rights violations.
moving SociaL rigHtS into tHe SpotLigHt
The Protocol is the first universal mechanism for adjudicat-
ing social rights. Several reasons why states should ratify the 
Protocol arise from that fact alone. As mentioned, the Protocol 
brings an end to sixty years of neglect of social rights exempli-
fied also by a lack of effective overview mechanisms. Social 
rights have been marginalized in the discourse both at an inter-
national level and in the vast majority of states. The Protocol 
transforms the theory that the protection of all human rights 
requires the same emphasis24 into practice. It highlights social 
rights, which is a necessary precondition for improving their 
overall enjoyment. There are two principal ways the Protocol 
can achieve this objective.
First, individual applications telling individual stories will 
make social rights more attractive for a public audience. Social 
rights will acquire a human face. Such stories are able to gain 
public awareness in a way that concluding recommendations on 
periodic reports can never do. The media is more likely to report 
the story of a person living in slums than to report that a com-
mittee “is concerned about the lack of a national housing policy 
which . . . addresses the needs of . . . those living in slums.”25 
This will generate higher awareness of social rights among a 
larger population and foster local movements for protection of 
social rights. The media and the general public’s focus on these 
rights is likely to generate greater government interest and con-
sequently better protection of these rights.
Second, a possibility of an international quasi-judicial review 
provides governments with high incentives to resolve problems 
at home, rather than facing the prospect of a negative outcome of 
an international procedure. Governments generally try to avoid 
condemnations at the international level.26 This will inevitably 
encourage states to pay greater attention to social rights and 
provide effective remedies at home. Consequently, victims’ right 
to an effective remedy will be strengthened.
Current neglect of social rights at the international level 
results in many governments logically paying more attention 
and devoting more resources to protecting civil rights than social 
rights. This is an arbitrary distinction between civil and social 
rights that hurts those suffering from or susceptible to social 
destitution. Similarly, even though protection of all human rights 
is important, when states allow individual petitions for civil 
rights violations and not social rights violations, they implicitly 
privilege one group (victims of civil rights violations) against 
others (victims of social rights violations). The Protocol ends 
this schism and presents an opportunity to intensify social rights 
protection domestically.
It will be wise for governments to internalize social rights 
into policy and decision-making processes. Government must 
consider consequences for social rights of all their actions and 
devise concrete plans for furthering the realization of social 
rights. This will be the best for ensuring that they comply with 
obligations under the Covenant. In this way, the Protocol may 
lead governments to mainstream social rights into all their activ-
ities. Mainstreaming social rights is needed to prevent violations 
in the first place. Thus, the Protocol will strengthen domestic 
implementation of the Covenant.
This also implies that allowing individual adjudication of 
social rights is not an expensive way to achieve justice for indi-
viduals. On the contrary, at most times the decision will have 
a systemic effect. Besides providing a possible remedy for the 
actual petitioner, states will have a chance to adjust their prac-
tices which will often positively affect a much wider population. 
Examples of this systemic effect from national jurisdictions 
are distribution of food to all those suffering from hunger,27 
nationwide distribution of AIDS treatment drugs,28 or extending 
the right to social security to all non-nationals with permanent 
residence.29
adJudication aS a Benefit for good faitH StateS
The procedure established by the Protocol cannot, however, 
be seen as a whip under which states will labor to improve social 
rights. On the contrary, the rationale of the procedure is to help 
states fulfill their obligations under the Covenant by considering 
individual cases and decisions based on real-life situations. The 
decisions will provide guidance in situations that states face in 
practice. The views of the Committee will highlight issues that 
the state possibly overlooked or misinterpreted. Any state that 
is serious about good faith fulfillment of international obliga-
tions will welcome the mechanism as a source of insight into its 
duties. By ratification, a state will take the moral high ground 
and be seen as treating its international obligations under the 
Covenant seriously.
Moreover, individual adjudication of social rights will 
help identify and suggest solutions for actual problems on the 
ground. Individuals themselves know best what troubles them. 
Petitions brought by individuals will thus be a valuable source 
of information where problems are perceived.30 This will be an 
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indication both for the governments and international commu-
nity of what kind of issues to address.
SoLving tHe aLLeged vagueneSS of SociaL rigHtS and 
cuLtivating compLiance
The Protocol will address the issue that some states have 
against the adjudication of social rights, namely their vagueness. 
This argument for perceived unjusticiability of social rights can 
be actually reversed. Perhaps social rights are vague because they 
are not adjudicated. The Protocol will break this vicious circle 
and contribute to better understanding social rights’ content and 
the obligations arising from them. Even though the Committee 
has done a considerable amount of work to this end, especially in 
its general comments, there is only so much that it can achieve. 
As Craig Scott and Patrick Macklem state, “there are limits to 
how well any supervisory body, no matter how democratic, dili-
gent, or expert, can determine whether policies and laws respect 
human rights without having the benefit of real-life detail that 
individual petitions provide.”31
At the same time, states do not need to fear that any bind-
ing decisions will be imposed on them. The Committee has the 
power to issue only non-binding recommendations. The rationale 
of the Protocol is not enforcement, but rather more subtle kinds 
of implementation like highlighting, mainstreaming and assist-
ing the governments to identify with more precision their obli-
gations under the Covenant. Contrary to what Michael Dennis 
and David Stewart in their article claim, the Protocol is exactly 
that kind of soft enforcement of international law via “norm-
internalization,” and cultivation of “voluntary obedience” that 
they favor as opposed to compelling compliance.32 Furthermore, 
as Thomas Franck argued, the indeterminacy of norms is a cause 
for lower levels of compliance.33 Thus the concretizations of the 
obligations will further induce better levels of voluntary state 
compliance with obligations under the Covenant.
ending tHe marginaLization of victimS
States should ratify the Protocol because it will allow indi-
viduals to publicly tell their stories at an international level. The 
benefits human rights victims derive when judicial bodies listen 
to their stories are studied within the context of international 
criminal justice. The benefits include relieving victims’ sense of 
societal abandonment, the psychological benefits of testifying or 
publicly telling their story and victims’ sense of empowerment.34 
There is no reason to believe that these positive effects will not 
apply in cases of social rights violations. Adjudication trans-
forms experienced neglect into a situation where problems mat-
ter and brings the individuals hope. In many cases, it might well 
be a false hope when no improvement materializes, or at least 
not in the short-term. But it is submitted that when an indepen-
dent expert body reviews the case, a different level of respecting 
the inherent dignity of every individual is achieved.
Another important reason states should ratify the Protocol 
lies in the nature of rights as tools of empowerment. The poor 
protection of social rights most seriously affects people living on 
the margins of society. These people are often disadvantaged in 
many ways and effectively unable to claim their rights through 
usual democratic processes. Their political power is insignifi-
cant. If anything, their unpopularity among majority populations 
invites politicians, who are trying to win minds of the majority, 
to further socially exclude them. A classic example is the treat-
ment of the Roma minority in many European countries. Social 
rights and their judicial protection provide important empower-
ment and voice to legitimate claims. As the Committee put it, the 
non-justiciability of social rights “would also drastically curtail 
the capacity of the courts to protect the rights of the most vulner-
able and disadvantaged groups in society.”35
Sandra Fredman elaborated this point, arguing that judicial 
protection of social rights strengthens democracy. The courts 
can hold those in power accountable and they can assure that a 
decision by an executive was done in a deliberative fashion with 
proper reasons.36 By giving voice to minorities, adjudication 
remedies the majoritarian bias of democracy.
The arguments presented above are valid reasons why 
states should ratify the Protocol. Some states, however, may 
be concerned for some reasons with social rights protection 
in other states. For example, some might be concerned about 
the plight of humans anywhere on the planet but others might 
be concerned with social rights abroad because they do not 
want people migrating to their country to enjoy greater social 
rights protection. Whatever reason a state has in supporting 
social rights abroad, it is hardly possible for it to propose that 
other states ratify the Protocol without itself first being a party. 
Therefore, this serves as another reason for a state to become a 
party to the Protocol.
Finally, some governments, including Japan, are not cat-
egorically against ratifying the Protocol. Instead, they want to 
see how the mechanism will work before committing to it. Yet 
if every state waited for others to make the first move, no state 
would ratify the Protocol. More importantly, there are additional 
advantages to becoming a party soon. Ratification will present 
the state as sympathetic to social rights and as wishing to live 
up to the standards set sixty years ago by the UDHR. The first 
ratifying states will also have the biggest influence on how the 
procedure will develop in practice. They will be able to frame 
the procedures and standards of review for all the subsequently 
ratifying states. Finally, states retain the authority to denounce 
the Protocol if they are unhappy with the Committee’s interpre-
tations of its powers or of the Covenant’s provisions.
concLuSion
This short essay has argued that states have nothing to fear 
from ratifying the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. It is a great opportunity 
for states to focus on complying with their obligations under the 
Covenant and to seriously address the social rights of their popu-
lation. The Protocol has the potential to improve social rights 
protection. Of course, this is not to suggest that social rights adju-
dication is a panacea that will solve all problems in the world. It 
is only one part, though very important, of a broader mosaic of 
effective human rights protection. Overall, the Protocol can help 
to realize the promise of the UDHR of an “advent of a world in 
which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief 
and freedom from fear and want.”37 It is now up to the states 
whether they will live up to the promise and ratify the Protocol 
or let it slowly decay into disuse and thus neglect the fundamen-
tal needs of millions of people.  HRB
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